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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
GAYLE KEITH WESLING aka SESLING )
aka WES SESLING,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)

NO. 43126
Ada County Case No.
CR-2014-9031

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Wesling failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of his concurrent unified sentences of 14 years
with two years fixed, for grand theft, and five years, with two years fixed, for criminal
possession of a financial transaction card?

Wesling Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Wesling pled guilty to grand theft and to criminal possession of a financial
transaction card, and the district court imposed unified sentences of 14 years, with two
years fixed, for grand theft, and five years, with two years fixed, for criminal possession

1

of a financial transaction card. (R., pp.62-66.) The district court ordered that Wesling’s
sentences in this case run concurrently with each other but consecutively to his
sentence in Ada County Case number CR-2014-6459. (R., pp.63-64.) Wesling filed a
timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentences, which the district court denied.
(R., pp.70, 80-85.) Wesling filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s
order denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.86-88.)
Wesling asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule
35 motion for reduction of his sentences because he was unable to immediately be
placed at the work center due to his classification as a medium risk by the Idaho
Department of Correction. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.) Wesling has failed to establish an
abuse of discretion.
In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho
Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a
sentence.” The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35
motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Absent the presentation of new evidence,
“[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review
the underlying sentence.” Id. Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440,
442 (2008).
Wesling did not appeal the judgment of conviction in this case. On appeal, he
merely argues that the district court should have reduced his sentences pursuant to his
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Rule 35 motion because he was unable to be immediately placed at the work center
due to his classification as a medium risk by the Idaho Department of Correction.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)

Although Wesling claims that the district court was

“attempting to mitigate” the accrual of “significant interest before he is able to start
paying restitution” (Appellant’s brief, p.6), at no point did the district court indicate that
its intention was to prevent Wesling from accruing interest on the $9,424.26 he was
ordered to pay in restitution (see Tr., p.30, L.11 – p.38, L.4). Rather, the district court
noted that “by the time you even are able to start paying restitution, with the interest
alone we’re probably talking about an 18,000 to $20,000 bill, which will increase every
year” (Tr., p.34, L.24 – p.35, L.2), and explained:
I’m going to run this sentence consecutive to Judge Hippler’s
sentence, and the reason for that is, one, to ensure that [Wesling is] under
supervision for some period of time; and, two, to ensure that he has plenty
of time to get this restitution paid and that’s why. And I do recognize the
impact of a consecutive sentence.
(Tr., p.35, Ls.5-11). In its order denying Wesling’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of
sentence, the district court stated, “It is not new information to observe that an inmate
may not be immediately eligible for the work center or that the sentence impacts his
eligibility for specific programs.

The Court was and is aware its sentence impacts

Department of Correction programming decisions.” (R., p.81, n.1.) Because Wesling
presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in
the motion that his sentences were excessive. Having failed to make such a showing,
he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his
Rule 35 motion.
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Even if this Court addresses the merits of Wesling’s claim, Wesling has still failed
to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the district court’s
Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.
(Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
denying Wesling’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentences.

DATED this 1st day of December, 2015.

_/s/_____________________________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of December, 2015, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/____________________________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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IN TI IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3
4

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
5

Plaintiff::

6
7

vs.

8

GAYLE KETTI I WES! .ING,

CASE NO. CR-FE-2014-0009031

ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION
9

Defendant.

10

II
12

On Novcmbet· 13, 2014, the Court sentenced Gayle Keith Westing on Count I. Grand Theft,

Felony, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), -2407(1)(b), -2109, to an aggregate tenn of fourteen (14) years, with a
minimum period of confinement of two (2) years, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of

13

custody not to exceed twelve (12) years. The Cou11 sentenced him on Count II. Criminal Possession

14

of a Financial Transaction Card, Felony, I.C. §§ 18-3 125, -3128, to an aggregate tenn of five (5)

15

years, with a minimum period of confinement of two (2) years, followed by a subsequent

16

indetenninate period of custody not to exceed three (3) years. The Court ordered both counts to run

17

concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the sentence in Case No. CR-FE-2014-6459. The

18

Court further recommended he be placed in the Community Work Center.
Wesling did not appeal the Court's sentence.

19

20

Westing's counsel, T.ance Fuisting, timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence
pursuant to Rule 35, !.C.R., on March 2, 2015.

21

Westing requests a hearing and the Court denies his request. !.C.R. 35 provides in part, as

22

follows: " ... Motions to correct or modify sentences under this rule ... shall be considered and

23

determined by the court without the admission of additional testimony and without oral argument,
unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion; ...."

24
25
26

ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION
CASE NO. C R-J<'E-2014-0009031

000080

1

•

•

Westing presented no new infonnation but requests the Court reduce hjs senlem.:e or run his
sentence concurrent with his other case. He simply reargues his sentence. The burden is on a
2

defendant to prove a sentence is unreasonable. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 978 P.2d 214, 219

3

(1999). Furthermore, a motion for reconsideration MUST be supported by new or additional

4

infonnation. 1 It is not appropriate to simply reargue the sentence. That is not the purpose of a motion

5

for reconsideration.

6
7

8
9
10

II
12

A motion for reduction ofa sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Copenhaver, 129 Idaho 494,
496, 927 P.2d 884, 886 (1996); State v. Buok, 127 Idaho 352, 355, 900 P.2d 1363,
1366 (1995); State v. Knighton, 143 Tdaho 118,319, 144 P.Jd 23, 24 (2006); Stale v.
Allbee, 115 fdaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct.App.1989). Nevertheless, as
discussed above, our Supreme Court has held that a defendant presenting a Rule 3S
motion must submit new 01· additional informntion In support of the motion, and
an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion "cannot be used as a vehicle to
review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new evidence."

Htiffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840. Accordingly, because Shumway
presented no new or additional evidence in support of his motion, we will not review
the reasonableness of the sontonce nor disturb tho district court's ordo1· denyin~

the motion.
13
14

15
16
17

18
19

20

21

State v. Shumway, 144 Idaho 580, 583, 165 P.3d 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added). The

Idaho Supreme Court has made this clear.

However, Rule 35 does !!fil function as an appeal of a sentence. Instead, it is a
narrow rule allowing a trial court to correct on illegal sentence (at any time) or to
correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner (within 120 days) ... . When
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the dcfemhmt must show that the sentence is
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
distl'ict court in support of the Rule 35 motion. Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320, 144
P.3d at 25; State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003); State v.
Strand. 137 Idaho 457, 463, 50 P.3d 472, 478 (2002); see also State v. Wright, 134
Idaho 73, 79, 996 P.2d 292, 298 (2000). An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the
presentation of new information....

State v. lll{/Jman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)(emphasis added).
22
23

24
25
26

1
It Is not new infomiation to observe that an inmate may not be immediately eligible for lhe work center or that the
sentence impacts his eligibility for specific programs. The Court was and is aware its sentence impacts DepRrtment of
Correction programming decisions.
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•
As further discussed below, Wesling has not presented any infonnation to support his request
and hls request is denied.
2
J

4

ANALYSIS
Wesling requests leniency and a reduction in his sentences. The Court rejects his request.
Rule 35, !.C.R., provides in pertinent part as follows:

7

(M)otions to correct or modify sentences under this rule must be filed within 120 days
of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction
and shall be considered and determined by the court without the admission of
additional testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the court
in its discretion; ....

8

The determination of whether to grant the relief requested by Wesling is a matter committed to the

9

Court's discretion and the Court's decision is governed by the same standnl'd as the original sentence.

5
6

10

See State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156, 164, 989 P.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1995); Stale v. Ricks, 120 Idaho
875 (Ct. App. 1991 ). In this review, this Court has employed the standards set fo11h in State v.

11

Toohill, I 03 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982).

I?.

The Court m1rJe1·s(oorJ (hat this w<1s a matter of discretion and considered several factors both

13

in the original sentencing and in deciding this Motion For Reconsideration. A sentence has several

14

objectives: (1) protection of society, (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3)

15

possibility of rehabilitation, and (4) punishment for wrongdoing. The primary consideration is, and
should he, "the good order imcl protection of society." Stale v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707

16
17

(Ct. App. 1982).
In any sentt:ncing, lhe primary focus begins with a concern for protection of the public. In this

18

case, Wesling pied guilty to Count I. Grand Theft, Felony, J.C. §§ 18-2403(1), -2407(1)(b), -2409

19

and Count II. Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card, Felony, I.C. §§ 18·3125, -3128.

20

The Court imposed an aggregate term of fourteen ( 14) years, with a minimum period of confinement

21

of two (2) years, followed by a subsequent indetenninate period of cuMody not to exceed twelve (12)

years on Count I. The Court sentenced him on Count II to an aggregate tenn of five (5) years, with a
22

minimum period of confinement of two (2) years, followed by a subsequenl indeterminate period of

23

custody not to exceed three (3) years.. The maximum penalty for Grand Theft is fourteen ( 14) years

24

and for Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card is five (5) years.

25
26
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•
The fixed portion of a sentence imposed under the Unified Sentencing Act is treated as the
tcnn of confinement for sentence review purposes. State v. Hayes, 123 Idaho 26, 27, 843 P.2d 675,
2

676 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court finds that a two-year (2) fixed sentence for Grand Theft and for

3

Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card is lenient considering the facts of these crimes

4

and is well within the statutory sentence guiclelines. Furthennore, the Court consiclered the entirety of
the sentence, including any indetenninate time, and found it necessary to ensure Wesling, as a career
criminal with a lot of restitution owed, would be supervised and have the opportunity to repay his

6

victims.
7

The Court further finds imposing this case consecutively to a previous case was necessa1y. A
8

sentencing judge is authorized to impose a sentence to run consecutively to a sentence which has

9

previously been imposed. State v. Ricks, 120 Idaho 875,878, 820 P.2d 1232, 1233 (Ct. App. 1991);

10

State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho 399, 400-01, 565 P.2d 989, 990-91 (1977); State v. Lloyd, 104 Idaho

II

397, 401, 659 P.2d 151, 155 (Ct. App. 1983). The decision whether a sentence is to run

12

consecutively or concurrently with another sentence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125,126,609 P.2d 657,659 (1980); State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho

13

341,346,715 P.2d 1011, 1016 (Ct. App. 986).

14

In arriving at this sentence, the Court considered Wesling's character and any mitigating or

15

aggravating factors. The Court, however, found there were several aggravating factors in this case -

16

suggt:sting tht: m:t:d for this sentence. In particular, the Court's decision focused on rehabilitation,

17

retribution, and protection of society. The facts of these crimes and his criminal history suggested the
need for this sentence in order to properly rehabilitate hint

18

This was his seventh 11nu eighth lifetime felony conviction D.U.I. (I 992, 2002, 2002, 20022,
19

2014), and Deli very of c Controlled Substance ( 1995). He has numerous misdemeanor convictions as

20

well including D.U.I. (1988, 1988, 1990), Battery (1992), Possession of a Controlled Substance

21

(2013), and probation violations and failures to appear.
The Court found that this sentence would promote rehabilitation; there is a need for some

22
23

punishment that fits the crime before real rehabilitation will be effective. The Cou11 finds that this

24

25
26

2

The State dismissed a 2003 D.U.I. as well.
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e
sentence fulfill~ the ohjcetivcs of protecting society and achieves dete1Tence, rehabilitation, and
retribution, and therefore denies Westing's Motion for Reconsideration.

2
3

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 9th day of March 2015.
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